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THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE RULE OF
LAW: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
Matthias Hartwig*
INTRODUCTION
"A ghost is haunting Europe, the ghost of democracy" - this persi-
flage of the famous first sentence of the Communist Manifesto was a
common saying in many of the socialist countries just three years ago.
Today the ghost of the Communist Manifesto is itself disappearing as
democracy moves into the eastern wing of the common house of Eu-
rope, becoming the only legal and legitimate tenant of the various
rooms. In Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR),
Hungary, Bulgaria, the former German Democratic Republic (GDR),
Romania, and in many of the Republics of the former Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR), free elections have taken place and
brought democracy to the region.
The political landscape in these countries has drastically changed
with the end of socialism. The development of the State of Law is the
most fascinating and most important factor of the reforms and restruc-
turing being observed in Eastern Europe. Most of the recent constitu-
tional documents passed in Eastern Europe mention the principle of the
State of Law as the foundation for the legal order being erected.' The
* Assistant to the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of
Germany.
1. Article 1 of the Constitution of Poland (amended Dec. 29, 1989) reads: "The
Republic of Poland is a State of Law, which realizes the principle of social justice."
See HUNG. CONST. art. 2, para. 1; RUSSIAN CONST. art. 1.1 (draft); BULG. CoNsr. art.
4, para. 1; Ro. CONsT. art. 1, para. 3 (draft); Geza Kilenyi, Ungarn Schreitet in
Richtung Rechtsstaatlichkeit, EUROPAEISCHE GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFr 513 (1989)
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power of the State shall be bound by legal principles, not by the will of
those who hold power.
The former socialist states have all either reformed their constitu-
tions, adopted a new constitution,2 or, like the CSFR,3 adopted part of
a new constitution. These countries have implemented the provisions of
these acts with extensive legislation in such fields as: property, real es-
tate, corporations, as well as law regarding freedom of the press and
freedom of association. After all these years characterized by a sort of
legal nihilism in this region, Eastern European law, for the first time,
truly exists.
Since the middle 1980's, more statutes and decrees have been
adopted and more judicial sentences have been passed, at least in the
field of administrative and constitutional law, than in all the time since
the Second World War. It is impossible to deal with all the details of
these enactments in this Article. This Article, therefore, is limited to
the constitutional courts.
The legal problems of the socialist countries did not originate due to
a lack of constitutional provisions. Even the bills of rights of these
countries, contained in the constitutions, cannot be considered as
under-developed, although the fundamental rights were operating
under restraints that limited the material value of these guarantees.
Non-application was the main problem with these socialist constitu-
tions. All organs of the state were bound by the constitution, but no
organ was controlled if it fulfilled the constitutional requirements. This
was the result of the socialist theory that all power is concentrated in
the soviets, the councils, or parliamentary organs. The idea of checks
and balances between and among the organs does not fit within that
theory.4 The protection of the supremacy of the constitution, therefore,
was not institutionalized.
This lack of control was significantly noticeable in the field of human
rights. There were rare cases, in both the civil and criminal courts, in
which the human rights laws were directly applied. Special organs for
(an analysis of the state of law in Hungary by former Hungarian Deputy Minister of
Justice); Laszlo Kiss, Einige Fragen der Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der Gesetzgebung in
Ungarn, OSTEUROPA RECHT 12 (1990); see also, A. A. Golzblat, State of Law or Dic-
tatorship, CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, DRAFT AND COMMENTARIES,
127 (Moscow 1991) (in Russian) (providing an historical description of the notion of
state of law).
2. BULG. CONST. (adopted July 12, 1991); Durzhaven Vestnik no. 56 (adopted July
13, 1991).
3. Charter of the Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the CSFR, UST.ZAK. c.23/
1991 Sb. (adopted Feb. 5, 1991).
4. K. Dimitrijevic, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Jugoslawien, ZEITSCHRIFT FUER
AUSLAENDISCHES OEFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOELKERRECHT, 170, 172 (1968).
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the protection of human rights did not exist. The problems of enforcing
human rights were connected with the lack of adequate institutions
able to cope with the task of realizing the guarantees given to the indi-
vidual by the constitutions.
It is important to establish constitutional courts in the former social-
ist countries. This has been the tendency observed in Europe since the
Second World War. With the end of a dictatorship, the restructured
state establishes a constitutional court. For these former socialist na-
tions, a juridical organ dedicated to constitutional control is considered
a constituent element of democracy."
The idea of establishing a constitutional court as a state organ is not
new to Central and East European nations. Some socialist constitutions
historically provided for a constitutional court, such as the Yugoslavian
Constitution of 1963 and the Czech and Slovak Constitution of 1965.
In Yugoslavia, however, the court failed to gain great influence within
the legal structure and in Czechoslovakia, the court was never created.
Only with the beginning of the current reforms, were the discussions
about such organs renewed. The discussions progressed at the same
speed as the political reforms. Thus, it was no accident that Poland
started to think about the introduction of a constitutional court before
the drastic political changes were foreseeable. The now defunct Soviet
Union also provided for a constitutional committee when it became evi-
dent that purely cosmetic corrections in the political system would not
suffice. Other countries such as Hungary, Bulgaria, and the CSFR es-
tablished the constitutional courts after the political changes took
place. This Article presents a broad overview of the composition and
functions of the constitutional court of each country and gives a short
analysis of the tendencies and underlying ideas of each.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF YUGOSLAVIA"
The constitutional court of Yugoslavia is not a product of the recent
period of "revolutionary reforms." On the contrary, this organ has lost
5. It must not be overlooked, however, that traditional democracies such as Great
Britain, Norway and Sweden do not have a constitutional court; this diminishes their
democratic qualities in no way. Sometimes these structures, however, cause problems
on an international level, especially insofar as the protection of human rights by the
European Court for Human Rights is concerned.
6. See Dimitrijevic, supra note 4, at 170 (providing a comprehensive description of
the composition and functions of the Yugoslavian constitutional court); see also A.
Fira, Report to the VIIth Conference of the European Constitutional Courts in Lisbon:
Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit im Macht- und Selbstverwaltungssystem der Sozialistis-
chen Foederativen Republik Jugoslawien (1987) (unpublished report) (discussing the
practice of the Yugoslavian constitutional court).
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all power at the time when its influence is needed the most - during
the current bitter dispute within the Federation, represented by Serbia
and Montenegro, and the seceding federal states.'
The Yugoslavian Constitutional Court is nevertheless, within this
context, a forerunner, to which the discussion on the establishment of
constitutional courts is always referred in the socialist countries. The
socialist state doctrine for a long time upheld the idea of the unity of
state power, and this meant that the will of a soviet could not be ques-
tioned by another organ. The Yugoslavian example is proof to the
contrary.'
The court is comprised of fourteen judges, elected by the federal as-
sembly for a term of four years. Each Republic sends two judges, while
the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Voivodina each send one. A
judge cannot be reelected. A judge may be removed only by the consti-
tutional court and only under certain conditions, such as the commis-
sion of a crime that requires a term of imprisonment or the permanent
loss of working capability.
The constitutional court has jurisdiction to review the constitutional-
ity of federal statutes and the statutes or norms, which are ranked be-
low statutes, of the republics. The constitutional court also has jurisdic-
tion to decide on conflicts between political communities, between the
Federation and the Republics, and between the Republics. The court
also can deliver advisory opinions on the compatibility of the constitu-
tion of a Republic with the constitution of Yugoslavia.
A special aspect of the constitutional court's jurisdiction is that it
can declare a norm unconstitutional not only because it positively vio-
lates the constitution, but also because it does not contain a provision
required by the constitution. A lack of implementation, essentially, con-
stitutes a violation of the fundamental law.
The initiative to review a norm can come from many sources. For
example, the Assembly and the Presidium of the Assembly, the Presidi-
ums of the Republics and autonomous provinces, the governments
(though not with respect to statutes adopted by the Assemblies), judges
and prosecutors, and any citizen are all authorized to bring a case
before the constitutional court. The court can also act on its own initia-
tive. In all cases, however, the control is abstract. No person or organ,
by bringing a case, must defend his, her, or its own interest.9 This
7. In the following it is supposed that the Federal State continues to exist although
this might be questioned.
8. L. Garlicki, Der Polnische Verfassungsgerichtshof in Rechtsvergleichender
Sicht, OSTEUROPA-RECHT 1, 8 (1986).
9. YUGO. CONST. art. 357, para. 1.
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shows that the real function of the constitutional court is to uphold the
constitutionality of the legal order and not to defend specific individual
rights.
The court's competence to bring in a draft of a bill lies in the same
line. This is a broad jurisdictional power, which is also found within the
committee of constitutional supervision of the former Soviet Union.
The constitutional court gets an almost legislative power, which is quite
significant for its role within the legal system. The main task of the
court is to defend the legal order and respect for the constitution in a
very broad sense.
The decisions of the constitutional court of Yugoslavia are binding,
apart from the advisory opinions on the constitutions of the Republics
or the autonomous provinces. 10 If it declares a statute unconstitutional,
the Assembly must change it. If the Assembly refuses to comply with
the court's decision, the statute loses its force after six months. This
provision was adopted as a compromise. On the one hand, the power of
the Assembly is respected insofar as the court itself cannot repeal a
statute. The statute loses its force either by an amendment by the par-
liament or by a constitutional provision. On the other hand, the court's
decisions have not only an advisory character, but a direct impact upon
the legal order.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF POLAND
Poland, with a history of non-conformism, started intensive discus-
sions on the establishment of a constitutional court in 1982, immedi-
ately after the proclamation of martial law in December 1981. On
March 26, 1982, the constitution was amended to include article 33,
which provides for the possibility of judicial review of norms. During
deliberations over the amendment, many different positions were ex-
pressed on the creation of such an organ. The issue of the transfer of
the highest controlling power to an organ other than the Sejm, the Po-
lish parliament, was the object of particularly animated debate because
it meant overcoming a traditional position of socialist state doctrine.11
The general structure and procedure of the constitutional court was
laid down in a statute on April 29, 1985.12 The Constitutional Court of
10. Id. at art. 375.
11. Garlicki, supra note 8, at 5.
12. Dziennik Ustaw Polskijej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej 1985, No. 22. Pos. 98
(German translation in WGO - MONATSHErTE FOR OSTEUROPISCHEs RECHT, 177
(1984/85)) [hereinafter Dziennik Ustaw]; see K. Dzialocha, Der Verfassungsgericht-
shof der Volksrepublik Polen (Gesetzliche Voraussetzungen), OSTEuRoPA-REcHrT, 13
(1986) (providing an analysis of this statute): R. Machaceke Z. Czeszejko-Sochacki,
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Poland consists of twelve members elected by the Sejm, for a term of
eight years. The eligibility requirements are profound knowledge in law
and the fulfillment of the criteria for becoming justices in the Supreme
Court or the Supreme Administrative Tribunal. The justices cannot be
reelected. The parliament can decide on the premature removal of a
member, but only if certain requirements, established by law, are ful-
filled. The judges enjoy immunity and independence 3 and their func-
tion is separate from any other function in a state organ.1
4
The Constitutional Court of Poland may decide the constitutionality
of a statute adopted by the Sejm, as well as the constitutionality and
legality of decrees of other state organs." International treaties, how-
ever, are not subject to judicial control by the court. This exception
exists because in Poland, the relation between domestic law and inter-
national law is still unresolved. 16 The constitutional court only has ju-
risdiction to deal with normative acts; administrative and judicial acts
escape its jurisdiction. It can review any case brought before it in an
incidental procedure that is relevant to a case pending before the court.
There is, contrary to the situation in the United States, no "diffuse
judicial review," although there exists a tribunal especially established
for this purpose.
Apart from incidental review, the constitutional court may decide on
a case if special state organs, such as the President, the Council of
Ministers, the state court or the presidents of the supreme courts (in
civil, criminal, and administrative matters), the Presidium, and/or the
committees of the Senate or fifty Senators, raise the question of consti-
tutionality of a certain act. This may be done by initiative of the re-
spective organs or after an analysis of the complaints brought before
them by the citizens.' 7 The court may also act on its own initiative. A
citizen, however, has no direct access to the court. This implies that the
court has only a limited and indirect capability to guarantee the protec-
tion of human rights. The creators of the constitutional court feared
that the tribunal might be overburdened with cases if the possibility of
individual complaints existed. In Poland, the institution of an
Die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Volksrepublik Polen, EUROPAEISCHE GRUN-
DRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT 269 (1989) (same).
13. Dziennik Ustaw, supra note 12, at art. 15 paras. 1 and 2.
14. Id. at art. 13, para. 5.
15. Id. at arts. 6, 7.
16. See K. Dzialocha, supra note 12, at 15; Z. Kedzia, Die Grundrechte in der
Aktuellen Polnischen Verfassungsdebatte, RECHT IN OST UtND WEsT 367, 371 (1990).
17. Dziennik Ustaw, supra note 12, at art. 9.
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ombudsman was introduced and was supposed to be, at least in theory,
a sufficient guarantee for human rights.1 8
The constitutional amendment of 1989 provides for a preventive con-
trol of normative acts."' The President may bring the question of a
statute's constitutionality, which has been adopted but not yet pub-
lished, before the court. The effects of the decision depend upon the
object of the review. If the constitutional court declares a statute,
adopted by the Sejm, to be contrary to the constitution, the case goes
before the parliament. The Sejm can then overrule the court's decision
with a two-thirds majority.20 This provision is a compromise between a
direct binding force of the court's rulings and a purely advisory func-
tion of the court. The parliament retains ultimate control concerning
the constitutionality of laws. If the parliament wants to retain a statute
that the court has declared unconstitutional, it needs a qualified major-
ity, which is the majority necessary to amend the constitution. In a
certain sense, the enforcement of an unconstitutional law constitutes an
amendment to the constitution.21
Decisions on other normative acts, such as the decisions of executive
organs, have direct binding force. The organ that issues the act has to
amend or repeal it within three months of its being declared unconsti-
tutional. If it does not do so, the act automatically loses its validity.
22
Decisions of regular or administrative courts that are based on norma-
tive acts later declared unconstitutional can be reversed in new hear-
ings or retrials within a certain period of time. If the constitutional
court declares an act unconstitutional more than five years after its
adoption, it must advise the Sejm about its conclusions. In this circum-
stance, the parliament is not required to change the act.23
The Constitutional Court in Poland started with fervent activity.
From 1986 to 1990, 123 questions were raised before it and seventy-
18. Actually, more than 50,000 complaints are brought before the ombudsman
every year. E. Letowska, Der Brirgerrechtsbeauftragte in der Volksrepublik Polen,
RECHT IN OST UND WEsT 261 (1989).
19. POL. CONST. art. 27 paras. 4 and 5; Dziennik Ustaw, supra note 12, at No. 19.
20. Dziennik Ustaw, supra note 12, at art. 6, para. 4.
21. In this context, it can be analogized to the concept of the German constitu-
tional doctrine "Verfassungsdurchbrechung," which means the change of the constitu-
tional order without changing the text of the constitution. This was quite common dur-
ing the Weimarer Republic and contributed to the degradation of the normative force
of the constitution, a reason for which the Bonner Basic Law prohibited a change of
the constitution without laying it down in the text.
22. Dziennik Ustaw, supra note 12, at arts. 8 and 9, paras. I and 2.
23. Id. at arts. 5, 21.
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eight decisions were delivered. In all, 449 provisions were discussed,
and almost half of them were declared unconstitutional.
24
III. THE COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL
OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
The idea of judicial review of statutes by courts was not completely
alien to the Soviet Union. The constitution of 1924 provided the possi-
bility for control over statutes of the republics, 25 although it was aban-
doned for a long time. Constitutional history was characterized by a
sort of legal nihilism. The concept of "socialisticeskaja zakonnost," so-
cialist legality, created by Stalin and then stressed during the Brezhnev
period, hid the defects in enforcing the constitution more than it
strengthened the respect for basic law. The Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet exercised a certain measure of control. This control, however,
did not work in times when the will of the party became the supreme
law of the land. The ill-advised article 6 paragraph 3 of the Constitu-
tion of 1977 guaranteed the Communist Party a powerful position be-
yond the constitution and further immunized it against any constitu-
tional control.
This structure was questioned shortly after perestroika started.
When the idea of the State of Law began to replace the ideology of the
dictatorship of the working class, it became necessary not only to list
the rights within the bill of rights of the constitution, but also to pro-
vide for mechanisms to enforce those rights. The establishment of the
Committee for Constitutional Control of the Soviet Union must be
viewed in the context of this development. The constitutional reform of
December 1, 1988, introduced in article 125 the possibility of establish-
ing a special organ to supervise the conformity of normative acts with
the constitution. 2 This provision was implemented by the statute of
24. See INFORMAICJA 0 ISTOTNYCH PROBLEMACH WYNIKJACYCH Y DZIALALNOSCI
I ORZECZNICTWA TRYBUNALU KONSTITUCYJNEGO W 1990 R. (Warsaw 1991) (compil-
ing statistics on the constitutional court of Poland).
25. See B. Wieser, Normenkontrolle unter der Sowjetischen Unionsverfassung von
1924, RECHT IN OST UND WEST (1991) (forthcoming) (providing a history of judicial
review in the early years of the Soviet Union).
26. See S.S. Alekseev, Probleme und Perspektiven eines Verfassungsgerichts, Os-
TEUROPA RECHT 196 (1991) (discussing the establishment and the activity of the Com-
mittee for Constitutional Supervision of the SSSR); B. Wieser, Das Komitee fuer
Verfassungsaufsicht der USSR: Entstehung - Rechtliche Grundlagen - Praktische
Taetigkeit, OSTEUROPA RECHT 174 (1991); see also M. Hartwig, Das Komitee fuer
Verfassungsaufsicht der USSR/Geschichte, Strukturen, Kompetenzen und erste
Gutachten, EUROPAEISCHE GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT 1, 14 (1991) (containing the




The Committee for Constitutional Control of the USSR was to be
comprised of twenty-seven members, all specialists in the field of polit-
ics and law.28 The members, one from each republic, were elected by
the Congress of the People's Deputies for a term of ten years.29 The
members were independent, subject only to the constitution, 0 and en-
joyed complete immunity.31
The Committee was competent to review: the constitutionality of leg-
islative projects and normative acts adopted by the parliament, the
Congress of the People's Deputies, or the Supreme Soviet; decrees and
decisions of the Council of Ministers; statutes of the Republics; and
international treaties that were submitted for ratification. 3 The Com-
mittee could only review normative acts, such as decisions of adminis-
trative authorities or of the courts. In this respect, its jurisdiction was
more limited than that of western constitutional courts.
The criteria of control derived from the constitution. Beyond that, all
acts, aside from the acts adopted by the Congress, were reviewed with
respect to the Constitution and to the acts adopted by the Congress. All
decrees were reviewed with respect to their conformity to the acts of
the Supreme Soviet. 33 The constitution further provided for an advisory
opinion as to whether a reviewed act conflicted with an international
obligation laid down in an international treaty. This reflects a general
tendency toward an emerging approach with respect to international
law. After having lost their ideological identity, Central and Eastern
European countries are attempting to find a new ground on which they
can establish their legal structure by referring to international
standards.
31
A qualified majority of one-fifth of the Congress, the Supreme So-
viet, its Presidium, and the supreme organ of the republics were each
27. Vedomosti S'ezda Narodnych Deputatov SSSR i Verchovnogo Soveta SSSR
1989, No. 29, st. 572, p. 817 [hereinafter Vedomosti SSSRJ; see Hartwig, supra note
26, at 44 (providing the German translation).
28. Vedomosti SSSR, supra note 27, at art. 5.
29. Id. at art. 6.
30. Id. at art. 24.
31. Id. at art. 27.
32. Id. at art. 10.
33. Id. arts. 16, 18.
34. Art. 5 para. 4 of the Bulgarian Constitution states: "Any international instru-
ments which have been ratified by the constitutionally established procedure, promul-
gated and come into force with respect to the Republic of Bulgaria, shall be considered
part of the domestic legislation of the country. They shall supersede any domestic legis-
lation stipulating otherwise." Compare Charter of the Fundamental Rights and Free-
doms of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic art. 2; Ro t. CONsT. art. 20 (draft).
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authorized to bring the question of the constitutionality of a constitu-
tion or a statute of a republic before the Committee. All such organs
were authorized to take the initiative with respect to normative acts of
other state organs and the Supreme Court, the prosecutor general, the
main arbitrator, the all-union organs of social organizations, and the
academy of sciences.? The Committee could also take up cases on its
own initiative.3 Citizens, however, had no direct access to the Commit-
tee. If a citizen wanted to raise the question of the constitutionality of a
normative act, he or she had to first address an organ that was author-
ized to bring the case before the Committee.
The Committee's opinions did not have binding, but only suspending
force. 8 If the Committee reached the conclusion that an act was un-
constitutional, it first submitted the act to the organ that adopted it."
The organ then had the opportunity to repeal the act within three
months. If the organ did not repeal the act within the three months, the
Committee required the repeal of the act by the Congress, Supreme
Soviet, or Council of Ministers. The Congress could overrule an advi-
sory opinion with a majority of two-thirds vote, the same majority re-
quired for the amendment of the constitution. 4° The decision of the
Congress was final.
There was one instance when the decision of the Committee had di-
rect binding force; if the Committee declared an act contrary to funda-
mental rights and freedoms, as laid down in the Soviet constitution or
in an international treaty in which the former Soviet Union was a
party, the act was null and void.41 The Soviet legislature was anxious to
qualify the Committee as a real constitutional court. This would have
meant a departure from the traditional state doctrine. Yet, the Com-
mittee was, by far, more than a purely advisory organ. Although the
Committee, created to protect the constitution, did not hold a position
elevated above other institutions in its specific field of activities, the
Committee was ranked higher than the ordinary legislature, which
could not uphold a statute declared unconstitutional. The Committee,
in a way, was transcending itself, enduring some characteristics that
could have developed in the direction of a true constitutional court. In
the course of the discussions on the new union treaty, there was an
35. Vedomosti SSSR, supra note 27, at art. 12, para. 1.
36. Id. at art. 12, para. 2.
37. Id. at art. 12, para. 3.
38. Id. at art. 21, para. 1.
39. Id. at art. 22, para. 1.
40. Id. at art. 22, para. 3, art. 19, para. 4.
41. Id. at art. 21, para. 3.
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intent to transform the Committee into such a court. The draft of the
constitution of Russia provided a real constitutional court and the stat-
ute establishing it has already been adopted.
Similar to the Yugoslavian and Polish constitutional court, the Com-
mittee for Constitutional Supervision within the USSR had the task of
guaranteeing respect for the legal order, but it did not protect against
the encroachment of individual rights by state authorities. This is ap-
parent through an analysis of the types of acts authorized for review
and of the organs capable of bringing such cases before the Committee.
The task of the Committee went beyond that of a mere constitutional
court, as it reviewed not only constitutional norms, but also the con-
formity of substatutory law to statutes. The protection of human rights
was only an indirect effect, as human rights were among the provisions
applied as the criteria of any review. The violation of these rules en-
tailed more direct consequences, as did the normative acts that auto-
matically lost their force if violated. Special attention was paid to these
norms and almost all cases decided by the Committee concerned ques-
tions of human rights. The Committee also had the responsibility to
ensure the legality of each act within the legal system and to monitor
the respect for the law by the State organs.
The Committee for Constitutional Control was established in May
1990. The members of the Committee were elected without the partici-
pation of the Baltic States and Kazakstan, which had already declared
their independence and, therefore, did not consider the Union compe-
tent to decide on their internal affairs.
The decree, by which the statute on the Committee was enforced,
made an exception with regard to normative acts of the republics.
4 2
The Committee was not considered competent to decide on such acts
before the enactment of the amendment of the parts of the constitution
concerning the federal structure. The Committee was only considered
competent to review cases when human rights were at stake.
The Committee delivered its first advisory opinion in July 1990. The
Committee subsequently delivered more than fifteen others. It consid-
ered most cases on its own initiative. It reviewed crucial issues, such as
the treatment of alcoholics and the freedom of movement, which was
sensitively limited by the necessity to get "propiska," permission to
move to another city. Perhaps the most famous and important case ad-
dressed concerned the secrecy of many normative acts in the Soviet
42. Vedomosti SSSR, supra note 27, at No. 29, st. 572, p. 820
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Union.43 The court declared all the acts that had not been published
null and void because they violated the fundamental principle that the
citizens must be informed about the norms in force in order to be able
to respect them and refer to them. The necessity of such an advisory
opinion proved the poor standard of the Soviet legal culture; yet, such
an advisory opinion also proved that the Committee did not deal with
marginal questions, but rather with issues that constituted the core of
the state of law.
Some cases raised the issue of whether various statutes of the repub-
lics violated human rights, as laid down in the constitution or in inter-
national treaties. Thus, for example, the Committee reviewed a statute
of a Baltic State that abolished the privileges of military personnel in
obtaining houses. In these latter cases, it was a central organ, generally
the president of the Supreme Soviet, that brought the case before the
Committee.44
In all cases in which the Committee reviewed a statute, it concluded
that the respective statute violated the constitution. This outcome was
due to the actual state of the Soviet legal system and the fact that the
Committee selected quite obviously violative cases. It also proved the
necessity of such a control. Although the Committee vanished along
with the Soviet Union, it illustrates the surprising development of con-
stitutional courts in Central and Eastern European nations.
IV. THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
The need to protect human rights was urgent45 prior to the great
changes in the political system, which, in Hungary, took place in a less
revolutionary fashion than in the other Eastern European countries. As
in Poland, the institution of an ombudsman was introduced in Hun-
gary. In the autumn of 1989, the political transition emerged and the
constitution was amended in order to conform to the exigencies of a
state of law. Among the first measures introduced was a constitutional
court with broad jurisdiction.48
43. Vedomosti S'ezda Narodnych Deputatov SSSR i Verchovnogo Sovieta SSSR
1990, No. 50 st. 1080, p. 1312.
44. The president of the Supreme Soviet was then Lukianov, a person who was
later arrested for his involvement in the coup of August 19, 1991.
45. G. Kilenyi, Ungarn schreitet in Richtung Rechtsstaatlichkeit, EUROPAEISCHE
GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRIFT 513 (1989).
46. Birosagi Tv. No. XXXII (Oct. 19, 1989) (Torveny a birosagokroi, Hungarian
Law on the Organization of Courts); A MAGYAR KOZTARASAG ALKETMANYA art. 32/
A (Constitution of Hungary).
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The court is comprised of fifteen judges elected by the parliament for
a term of nine years.47 The judges are elected from among academic
jurists of profound learning, university professors, doctors of legal sci-
ences, and lawyers with at least twenty years of professional practice.4 8
A judge may be reelected only once.49 A judge may be released from
duty or removed from the court for non-fulfillment of his duties. This is
preceded by a resolution of the court's plenum to this end.80 Each
member of the court is required to retire upon turning seventy.
The constitutional court has jurisdiction to investigate, ex ante, cases
concerning the unconstitutionality of bills, acts of parliament adopted
but not yet promulgated, the parliament's rules of procedure, and inter-
national agreements. 5' A motion to this end may be made by either the
parliament, any of its standing committees or a group of fifty members
of parliament, or by the president of the republic or the council of min-
isters.52 Further, the constitutional court is competent, ex post, to re-
view the conformity of statutes, decrees and, in contrast to the regula-
tions of the Polish constitutional court, other measures of the state
involving the constitution.53 In such instances, anyone may initiate a
procedure." A person, even a foreigner, who takes the initiative, does
not have to prove that he or she has a personal interest in the case. This
possibility of unlimited access to the court could lead to an overburden-
ing of this organ. There are already initial signs of such a development,
and it is probable that before long this procedure will be regulated in a
more restrictive manner.
A court that observes an unconstitutional provision in a case pending
before it is required to initiate a proceeding before the constitutional
court.55 In addition, any individual has the right to lodge a constitu-
tional complaint alleging an injury due to the application of an uncon-
stitutional provision of law with respect to his or her rights, providing
no other remedy is available.5" This includes cases in which the uncon-
stitutionality is a result of the non-implementation of the constitution.
The pure misapplication of a norm, however, does not in itself, allow
for judicial review.
47. Birosagi Tv., supra note 46, at arts. 4, 8 para. 3.
48. Id. at art. 5, para. 2.
49. Id. at art. 8, para. 3.
50. Id. at art. 15.
51. Id. at art. 1 (a).
52. Id. at art. 21, para. 1.
53. Id. at art. 1(b).
54. Id. at art. 21, para. 2.
55. Id. at art. 35.
56. Id. at arts. l(d), 21 para. 4, 48.
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Beyond the organs mentioned, which are capable of initiating a pro-
cedure on an unconstitutional law, any member of the parliament, any
minister, the president of the Supreme Court, and the chief procurator
is entitled to make a motion requiring the constitutional court to inves-
tigate conflicts of legislative provisions as well as other acts of state
organs that conflict with provisions of international agreements. 7 In
such instances, the court acts ex officio. If the national norm in ques-
tion is superior to the international norm, the court invites the organ
that concluded the international agreement to remove the conflict.
Once again, the special importance attributed to international norms in
today's Eastern European law systems is evident.
The court also decides on conflicts between organs or autonomous
authorities. 58 On request of the parliament, the Permanent Commission
of the parliament, the President of the Republic, the Council of Minis-
ters, the President of the Supreme Court, and the Prosecutor General,
the court is required to give an interpretation of the constitution. 9 The
court also has the authority to change an unconstitutional situation cre-
ated by the omission of a state organ, by inviting the competent organ
in default to comply with its duty.60
If the constitutional court declares a norm or another act of state
organs unconstitutional, it is authorized to annul them.61 The respective
acts lose their effect on the day the decision is published.62 Acts of state
organs based on a provision later declared unconstitutional are not af-
fected.63 The constitutional court is required, however, to order a retrial
of criminal proceedings.6 ' If in cases of ex ante investigations, the court
concludes that an act is unconstitutional, the parliament has to amend
it before adopting it.65 The decisions of the constitutional court are
binding.66
The Hungarian Constitutional Court has already experienced great
activity. It has dealt with crucial issues such as the death penalty, the
problem of data protection, the right to privacy, and the consequences
of expropriations under the socialist regime. The reasoning in its deci-
sions prove that, notwithstanding the adverse circumstances during the
57. Id. at arts. I(c), 21 para. 3, 44.
58. Id. at arts. 1(f), 50.
59. Id. at arts. 1(g), 51.
60. Id. at arts. l(e), 49.
61. Id. at art. 40.
62. Id. at art. 42.
63. Id. at art. 43, para. 2.
64. Id. at art. 43, para. 3.
65. Id. at art. 34, para. 2.
66. Id. at art. 27, para. 2.
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last forty years, Hungarian lawyers have succeeded in maintaining a
high level of legal tradition.
V. THE BULGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Bulgaria was the first country in the former socialist bloc to change
its constitution.67 The new constitution established the constitutional
court 8 and was adopted by the parliament. 69 The court consists of
twelve justices: one-third elected by the National Assembly; one-third
by a joint meeting of the Supreme Court of Cassation and the Supreme
Administrative Court; and one-third appointed by the President.70 The
justices of the court must be lawyers of high professional and moral
integrity with at least fifteen years of professional experience. Article
149 of the constitution and article 12 of the statute define the jurisdic-
tion of the court. According to these provisions, the constitutional court
has the power to give a binding interpretation of the constitution. It
reviews the constitutionality of statutes and other acts of the parlia-
ment and acts of the President in an abstract procedure. An organ
bringing a case before the court is not required to allege that it has
been injured with respect to its own rights. The court also has the au-
thority to review international treaties, based on their constitutionality,
prior to their ratification. In addition, the court reviews statutes with
respect to their conformity with generally recognized norms of interna-
tional law and international treaties. Once again, the importance of in-
ternational norms as criteria for the state of law is evident.
Further, the Supreme Court or the Supreme Administrative Court
can raise a question of constitutionality of a statute relevant in a case
to be decided by them. In such instances, the courts have to suspend
the procedure and wait for the decision of the constitutional court.71
The constitutional court also decides conflicts between organs of the
state, such as between the President and the Assembly or the Assembly
and the council of ministers, or between central organs and organs of
local self-government. The court has jurisdiction to review challenges to
the constitutionality of political parties and associations, the legality of
the election of the President and the Vice President, and the legality of
the election of a member of the National Assembly. Finally, the court
67. BULG. CONST. (adopted July 12, 1991); see Durzhaven Vestnik no. 56/1991
(July 13, 1991).
68. BULG. CONST. art. 147.
69. Darzhaven Vestnik no. 67/1991 (adopted Aug. 16, 1991).
70. Id. at art. 4. This procedure for composing the constitutional court is similar to
the Italian.
71. BULG. CONST. art. 150, para. 2.
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decides on impeachments by the National Assembly against the Presi-
dent or the Vice President.
In contrast to the Yugoslavian Court or the Committee for Constitu-
tional Supervision in the Soviet Union, the Bulgarian constitutional
court cannot take up a case on its own initiative. It may deal with a
question only if brought before it by the President, one-fifth of the dep-
uties, the Council of Ministers, the Supreme Court of Cassation, the
Supreme Administrative Court or the Procurator General.7 2 Individuals
do not have direct access to the court. Neither the constitution nor the
statute creating the court provides for individual complaints because of
the fear of overburdening the court.
The court must publish its decisions in the state Gazette within fif-
teen days. 73 Decisions are binding upon all state organs, juridical per-
sons, and citizens. 4 The constitutional court was established in October
1991, and expects to release its first decisions by the end of 1991.
VI. THE CZECH AND SLOVAK CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
Since 1968, the constitution of the former Czechoslovakia Socialist
Republic (CSSR) provided for a constitutional court. This tribunal,
however, was never constituted. After the November Revolution of
1989, Czechoslovakia, currently the Czech and Slovak Federal Repub-
lic (CSFR), started a profound reform of its constitution. In contrast to
the Bulgarian developments, though similar to what was taking place in
Poland and Hungary at the time, this reform did not lead to the adop-
tion of an integrated constitutional document, but rather to several
statutes that enjoy constitutional force.75 One of the most important
documents is the Charter of Rights, adopted in January 1991. Human
rights and fundamental freedoms are listed 76 in this document and the
constitutional court protects these rights. 7 The statute addressing the
constitutional court was adopted on February 27, 1991.
The court consists of twelve justices appointed by the President. The
President chooses from lists proposed by the Federal Assembly, the
Czech National Council, and the Slovak National Council. On each
list, there are eight individuals nominated; the federal list proposes four
candidates out of the Czech Republic and four out of the Slovak Re-
72. BULG. CONST. art. 150, paras. 1, 2; Darzhaven Vestnik, art. 16 (1991).
73. Darzhaven Vestnik, art. 14, para. 3 (1991).
74. Id. at art. 14, para. 6.
75. Like Austria, the CSFR has a tradition of having several texts compose the
constitution.
76. UST.ZAK. c.23/1991 Sb. (adopted Feb. 5, 1991).
77. Id. at art. 1, para. 2.
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public. Any person of good reputation who is thirty-five years old, has
an academic foundation in law, and has practiced as a lawyer for ten
years may be nominated. The term of office for each justice is seven
years.7 8 The justices enjoy immunity, which may be lifted only by the
constitutional court itself.
79
The constitutional court has jurisdiction in several areas: it can de-
cide on the conformity of the federal Parliment's statutes with the con-
stitution, and decrees and it controls situations where jurisdiction stat-
utes of the Federation, constitutional, or statutory acts of one of the
two republics, violate provisions of international human rights instru-
ments ratified by the CSFR.8 ° Here again, a special importance is at-
tached to international norms. The constitutional court is likewise com-
petent to review decrees and other norms under the statutes, with
respect to their conformity with the constitution or ordinary statutes.
The court further decides on federal conflicts,8 and construes the con-
stitution if an abstract question arises within this context.82 The disso-
lution of parties or political associations falls within its functions as
well. 83 The Czech and Slovak constitutional court, similar to the Hun-
garian Constitutional Court and in contrast to the Bulgarian Constitu-
tional Court, has the power to review individual complaints insofar as a
person alleges a violation of fundamental rights laid down in the consti-
tution or in an international treaty ratified by the CSFR.84
A norm is suspended if the constitutional court declares that it is not
in conformity with the constitution or an international treaty. The or-
gan that adopted the norm is then required to bring it in conformity
with the constitution. If it does not comply with this obligation, the
norm will lose its force after six months. The constitutional laws of the
two republics, however, are excepted from these consequences. This is a
concession to the autonomy of the republics, as the "federal question"
in the CSFR is not yet resolved.85
VII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF RUSSIA
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the republics composing it
have laid down the principles of their own statehood. It began with
78. Id. at art. 10.
79. Id. at art. 15.
80. Id. at art. 2.
81. Id. at art. 4.
82. Id. at art. 5.
83. Id. at art. 7.
84. Id. at art. 6.
85. Id. at art. 3.
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more political than constitutional declarations of independence, most of
them pronounced in 1990. When it became evident that the Soviet
Union would not be sustained, the republics set about to adopt their
own constitutions. Russia, the most advanced of the republics in this
respect, has provided, in all its projects, for a constitution and a consti-
tutional court. Even before the constitution was adopted, a statute on
the constitutional court was set in force. 86 This statute, comprised of
eighty-four articles, is the most comprehensive regulation on the com-
position, jurisdiction, and procedures of any constitutional court
adopted in any Central or Eastern European country. The court has
been created and the first decisions were expected by the end of 1991.
The court consists of fifteen judges elected by the Congress of Rus-
sia, on proposal of the President of the Supreme Soviet."7 Any person
between thirty-five and sixty years of age, who has a solid knowledge in
law, high moral qualities, and who has practiced law for more than ten
years is eligible.88 The term is unlimited, although judges must retire at
the age of sixty-five.
The Constitutional Court of Russia is competent to review interna-
tional treaties of Russia before they enter into force, as well as the
constitutionality of acts of the Congress or the Supreme Soviet and
other governmental organs.89 The constitutionality of a normative act
of a supreme organ, with the exception of those acts of the Congress,
the Supreme Soviet, or the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, is investi-
gated only with respect to the conformity of these acts with the division
of powers between the supreme organs.90 In reviewing an act of the
Republic of Russia, the only criteria of control the constitutional court
uses is distribution of the competencies. 1
The organs allowed to initiate a procedure before the constitutional
court are the Congress, the Supreme Soviet and the President of the
USSR, the respective organs of Russia, fifty deputies, the Supreme
Court, the Procurator General, the supreme organs of the republics
forming part of Russia, and the supreme organs of social organiza-
tions. 2 The Russian Constitutional Court, in contrast to the Commit-
tee for Constitutional Supervision of the former Soviet Union, is com-
86. Reprinted in ROSSISKAJA GASZETA, May 21, 1991, at 2-5 [hereinafter Russian
Code of 1991].
87. Id. at art. 3.
88. Id. at art. 12.
89. Id. at art. 57.
90. Id. at art. 55, para. 2.
91. Id. at art. 55, para. 3.
92. Id. at art. 59.
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petent to review individual complaints. 3 Any person who alleges injury
of a constitutional right through the application of the law by a state
organ may bring the case before the constitutional court within three
years of the injury. The admissibility of the individual's complaint re-
quires that the complaining person must first exhaust all legal reme-
dies. The constitutional court does not admit the complaint if it does
not seem suitable to it.
The constitutional court may inform other organs of the violation of
the constitution. The organs to which such information is directed must
take notice of it within one month and then inform the constitutional
court of the measures taken to abolish the unconstitutionality!" Every
year the constitutional court delivers a report on the "Constitutional
State of Affairs," which must be discussed by the Supreme Soviet or
the Congress within two months of receipt. 5
A normative act declared unconstitutional loses its force ex nunc.
The constitutional court may, however, make the act's invalidity retro-
active for up to three years. 8 The decisions of the court are binding on
the whole territory of Russia, on all organs and citizens." Decisions on
individual complaints only affect the parties involved. If the decision is
favorable to the complaining person, a rehearing of the case before the
ordinary tribunal is possible. The court's judgment may require an or-
gan to abolish an unconstitutional act. 8
VIII. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF ROMANIA
Romania has not yet adopted a new constitution or established a
constitutional court. A draft constitution, which is expected to be set in
force soon, however, provides for such a body. 9 The constitutional
court provides for nine members, three members appointed by the
Chamber of Deputies, three by the Senate, and three by the President
of Romania. 100 All members must be lawyers of high professional com-
petence with at least fifteen years of practical experience. 1E The jus-
tices will be independent and irremovable. 02 The constitutional court
will have the authority to make pronouncements regarding: the consti-
93. Id. at art. 57.
94. Id. at art. 55.
95. Id. at art. 54.
96. Id. at art. 65.
97. Id. at art. 3.
98. Id. at art. 73.
99. Rom. CONST. arts. 139-144.
100. Id. at art. 139.
101. Id. at art. 140.
102. Id. at art. 142.
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tutionality of organic laws prior to promulgation; initiatives to revise
the constitution; and, the constitutionality of ordinary laws before pro-
mulgation but upon notification by the President of Romania, the Pres-
ident of either Chamber of the Parliament, the government, the Su-
preme Court of Justice, or by at least fifty Deputies or twenty-five
Senators. The constitutional court will also have the authority to decide
the constitutionality of a law if such a question is raised before the
regular courts, to watch the procedure of a referendum, to decide im-
peachment issues, and to decide the constitutionality of political par-
ties. 103 The decisions of the constitutional court will be binding.
0 4
CONCLUSION
The institution of a constitutional court is, by far, not the only means
by which to guarantee constitutional or human rights norms. In the
Scandinavian countries, the ombudsman fulfills the function of a custo-
dian of human rights. Poland and Hungary followed this idea. But, for
the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe the constitutional
court is the most adequate institution to ensure the protection of
human rights.
The establishment of these courts may reinforce radical transforma-
tions from socialist states into states of law. The rule of law, as a basic
principle, has become the cornerstone of the legal systems in these
countries. The protection of this principle has already been institution-
alized, or will be soon, throughout all former socialist countries. Institu-
tions were specially created to defend the supremacy of constitutional
provisions against all other organs of the government - even the par-
liament. These nations do not confine themselves to drafting particu-
larly detailed constitutions, but are rather, more willing to provide for
effective procedures to turn the content of these norms into political
realities. The states will be ruled not only by the will of the legislature,
but by the fundamental principles laid down in the constitution. The
law will be binding on all institutions and will be enforced against
them. The law-defending function of the constitutional court has be-
come so essential that, in various countries, the constitutional courts
will even guarantee the hierarchy of norms that are beyond the protec-
tion of the constitutions. The law does not serve pure decorative goals,
but has become a goal in itself.
103. Id. at art. 143.
104. Id. at art. 144.
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Many states prefer to give constitutional courts independence from
other organs through systems of election and appointment of its judges.
In all of these states, the removal of justices is not purely within the
discretion of the electing or appointing organ. The justices can be re-
moved only if certain conditions, prescribed by the respective statutes
or constitutions, are met. The justices also enjoy immunity, which gives
them additional independence.
In some countries, the jurisdiction of the court goes even beyond the
functions ordinarily ascribed to constitutional courts. In the former So-
viet Union and Yugoslavia, for example, the courts had the authority to
declare an act unconstitutional or to introduce a statute to parliament.
Moreover, in many countries, the courts have the ability to take up a
case on their own initiative. This vast authority symbolizes how much
trust is given to the courts. It is believed that this trust will more effec-
tively ensure the observance of the constitution.
It is significant that most of the nations in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope attach a special importance to the provisions of international law
that reinforce the legitimacy of the law as applied by constitutional
courts. This admission supports the view that the internal laws of these
nations lag behind the principles developed on an international level.
One reason for the focus on international law may be the complete loss
of legitimacy of the state after the failure of the socialist experience.
The international standards to which the majority of civilized states are
bound gain their legitimacy out of their general recognition. Interna-
tional standards express general principles of law which, in turn, add
legitimacy to the new nation's government.
The will of the Central and Eastern European states to join interna-
tional and regional organizations, such as the European Council or the
European Communities, must be preceded by the fulfillment of certain
conditions guaranteeing that each member state be a free and demo-
cratic country ruled by law. The introduction of constitutional courts
may enable these countries to reach this goal of membership and may
help close the gap separating former socialist nations from western de-
mocracies. The state of law or the rule of law as a common value of all
European nations may further solidify the European community.
Human rights must be protected in all countries, even where the in-
dividual is without standing before the constitutional court. The most
significant and most effective protection of human rights is guaranteed
by the individual complaint mechanism. Where every individual has di-
rect access to the court, he or she can defend his or her rights. Direct
access to a court enables the individual to gain status as an autonomous
personality vis-a-vis the state. The constitutional courts will become the
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custodians of the constitutions, and will enable individuals to defend
their rights, even against state organs. The constitutional courts will
inspire trust in the law and will foster respect for the newly established
legal systems of Central and Eastern Europe.
